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Abstract 
This paper aims to test the validity of the Ricardian proposition for the Spanish economy 
from three different approaches: a) by testing its theoretical implications on the stability of 
national saving and the relationship between fiscal and current account balances, b) by 
carrying a number of tests on different structural consumption equations and, c) by testing 
this hypothesis in consumption functions stemming from the Euler equations derived from 
a consumer’s maximization problem. Our results lean toward rejection of the Ricardian 
proposition, although some degree of substitution between public and private saving is 
detected. In terms of policy implications, these results would suggest that there is some 
room for fiscal policy to exert its countercyclical role in the case of Spain. However, the 
effectiveness of such a policy might be limited in a context of rising debt ratios that trigger 
sustainability concerns and make consumers increasingly Ricardian. 
Keywords: Ricardian equivalence, debt neutrality, saving, fiscal policy. 
JEL codes: E62, E21, H30. 
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1 Introduction 
The Ricardian equivalence proposition states that, under certain circumstances, the decision 
to finance public expenditure via higher taxes or by public debt issuance (and thus future 
higher taxes) is immaterial for private consumption decisions. Accordingly, households do not 
consider public debt holdings as net wealth. For this result to hold consumers have to be fully 
rational and be aware that current and future public spending will eventually have to be paid. 
Thus, the present value of such public expenditure flows enters their intertemporal budget 
constraint, thereby reducing their permanent income. Consequently, changes in the 
intertemporal allocation of taxes only affect private saving, leaving consumption unaffected. 
Moreover, within a Ricardian framework, fiscal policy measures implying shifts in public 
spending will induce responses of private consumption and saving with opposite signs. It is 
worth noting that this theoretical proposition is derived under very tight conditions, difficult to 
observe in practice. 
The extent to which consumers behave in relation to the provisions of Ricardian 
equivalence may have important policy implications in real economies. In particular, 
Ricardian equivalence may condition the effectiveness of discretionary fiscal policy measures. 
Specifically, Ricardian consumers would anticipate the future cost of public spending 
increases and would react accordingly by increasing saving. In this context, one should not 
expect much from fiscal measures due to consumers’ reaction. By contrast, fiscal stimuli are 
expected to be effective with non-Ricardian or credit-constrained consumers. 
Many empirical papers have tested whether actual data are consistent with 
the Ricardian equivalence, the bulk of which focus on the US economy. In particular, 
Kochin (1974), Barro (1979), Seater (1982), Kormendi (1983), Aschauer (1985), Seater and 
Mariano (1985), Kormendi and Meguire (1986) or Leiderman and Razin (1988) have reported 
evidence consistent with the Ricardian hypothesis (although sometimes in its weak version1), 
whereas Buiter and Tobin (1979), Blinder and Deaton (1985), Modigliani and Sterling (1986), 
Feldstein and Elmendorf (1990), Evans (1993) or Himarios (1995) among others have 
obtained the opposite result. Likewise, some interesting empirical studies can be found 
for Spain, most of them rejecting Ricardian equivalence. In particular, while Raymond 
and González-Páramo (1987), Argimón (1996) or Marchante (1993) reject this proposition, 
Fuster (1993) and García and Ramajo (2002) collect evidence consistent with partial debt 
neutrality, thereby rejecting the strict version of Ricardian equivalence. Finally, Afonso (2008), 
with panel data for 15 European countries2, gets evidence against the hypothesis of debt 
neutrality, especially for countries with lower debt-to-GDP ratios, among which Spain enters 
given the sample used. 
 This paper analyses whether the Ricardian equivalence proposition holds for the 
Spanish economy by running a number of tests that address this question from different 
angles. In this regard, our study is similar to García and Ramajo (2002) since they test the 
Ricardian hypothesis with different specifications stemming from alternative approaches. 
                                                                          
1. The weak version of the Ricardian equivalence proposition (also referred to as partial debt neutrality) holds when 
private consumption is negatively affected by public expenditure, although with a lower coefficient than income. 
Intuitively, it means that private and public savings are substitutes, though imperfect. It is worth noting that, in this 
situation, the Ricardian equivalence proposition in its strict theoretical formulation does not hold. This terminology 
is borrowed from Fuster (1993) and García and Ramajo (2002). 
2. The former EU-15. 
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In this regard, one of the novelties of our paper is the use of quarterly data along with 
covering the most recent period. As for the rest of the paper, section 2 explains very simply 
the Ricardian proposition and the assumptions thereof to illustrate the rationale of the 
tests used. Next, section 3 reviews the different approaches proposed in the literature, 
and followed in this paper, to test the validity of the Ricardian proposition. Section 4 presents 
our econometric results and confronts them briefly with previous studies. Finally, section 5 
offers some conclusions. 
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2 The Ricardian equivalence hypothesis 
The Ricardian equivalence is a theoretical proposition whose first formal formulation is due to 
Barro (1974), although the intuitive idea had already been introduced well before by the British 
economist David Ricardo in the nineteenth century.3 Basically, this proposition states that, 
under certain circumstances, it would be irrelevant whether deficits are financed by issuing 
public debt or by raising taxes. The reason is that fully rational households discount the 
financial implications of public expenditure decisions or, in other words, they internalise 
the government’s intertemporal borrowing constraint. Households are aware that the current 
stream of public outlays, jointly with the current stock of public debt, will eventually have to be 
paid. If their consumption decisions are determined by their permanent or life-time income, 
they are indifferent between paying more taxes at present and lower in the future, or vice 
versa, to finance a given amount of public spending provided that their time horizon coincides 
with the government’s one. In any case, households’ permanent income is reduced by the 
expected discounted present value of current and future public expenditure. In a simplified 
way, period-t government’s budget constraint can be written as 
 tttt trbgb  1  
where bt is the end-of-period t government debt, gt primary government spending, tt 
represents government revenue, typically lump-sum taxes, and r is the nominal interest 
rate on government debt, assumed to be constant for simplicity. Solving forward, the 
government’s intertemporal budget constraint is obtained 
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borrowing constraint implies that the current market-value stock of debt has to be equal to 
the present discounted value of the future stream of primary surpluses. The government’s 
intertemporal budget constraint can be re-arranged as 
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Analogously, the representative consumer’s budget constraint can be represented as 
 ttttt tcrawa  1   
where at are net assets held by consumers, including public debt holdings, wt households’ 
labour income, ct private consumption and tt (lump-sum) taxes paid. Following the same logic 
as for the government, the representative infinitely-lived consumer’s intertemporal budget 
constraint can be expressed as 
                                                                          
3. See Ricardo (1817). 
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Let us assume for simplicity that the only assets in the economy are public bonds, i.e. at = bt.4 
Substituting (1) into (2) and re-arranging leaves the consumer’s budget constraint as 
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Accordingly, (3) shows the way public spending is financed does not affect 
households’ consumption decisions. All that matters is the present-value of the government 
spending path, which is understood as reducing permanent income. Consequently, given 
that tax or debt financing of a given public expenditure path is immaterial for consumption 
decisions, public debt does not constitute net wealth for households. For this reason, the 
Ricardian equivalence proposition is also known as the debt neutrality hypothesis. Moreover, 
consumption decisions are not affected by the intertemporal allocation of taxes. Changes in 
their intertemporal profile are reflected in both private and public saving with opposite 
signs. Consequently, public and private saving are perfect substitutes. Hence, if consumers 
are Ricardian, national saving as a percentage of total income should be stable and the 
general government balance by itself should not affect the current account balance. 
Specifically, fiscal policy shocks should translate into responses of private saving of the same 
size but with opposite sign, leaving the current account unaffected.5 
Notwithstanding the fact that Ricardo largely dismissed this idea on practical 
grounds because of being aware of its numerous limitations, this proposition was called the 
“Ricardian equivalence hypothesis” [Buchanan (1976)]. In this respect, the above equations 
show that the Ricardian equivalence proposition is derived under very restrictive assumptions. 
In particular, the Ricardian proposition is based on the assumption of infinitely-lived 
individuals. However, if consumers’ life horizons are shorter than those of which taxes 
are levied upon to repay the debt, tax duties will not fully offset present-value interest 
payments. Barro (1974) attempts to solve this shortcoming by introducing intergenerational 
links. Therefore, future generations are allowed to receive bequests from the current ones, 
whereas the utility function of consumers is also affected by the utility of their descendants, 
thereby restoring Ricardian equivalence. Nevertheless, the presence of childless households 
or finite horizons due to a given probability of dying [Blanchard (1985)] makes the Ricardian 
hypothesis fail. In fact, the effect of finite horizons is claimed by the literature as the most 
obvious reason for Ricardian equivalence to fail.6 However, there are other important reasons 
for this proposition to fail, notably liquidity constraints, distortionary taxes rather than 
lump-sum ones7, or uncertainty about future taxes and income. Therefore, since there are 
good arguments for Ricardian equivalence to fail, it is clear that the issue is essentially 
empirical, namely how important departures from Ricardian equivalence are [Blanchard and 
Fischer (1989), Seater (1993)]. 
                                                                          
4. This assumption does not modify the theoretical implications in that if at includes assets other than public debt, for 
instance foreign assets, (3) would still hold, augmented only with the stock of foreign assets in period t-1. 
5. By contrast, if agents are not Ricardian, for a given path of government spending, a shift from tax to debt financing 
raises private consumption and contributes to deteriorate the current account. Therefore, non-Ricardian behaviour, 
as suggested by the Keynesian model, is consistent with the twin-deficit hypothesis. 
6. See, for instance, Blanchard and Fischer (1989) or Cardia (1997). 
7. Distortionary taxes may entail non-linear effects on consumption decisions. In this regard, different intertemporal 
tax profiles affect permanent income and thus consumption decisions. On the other hand, the Ricardian proposition 
is derived under the assumption of non-productive public expenditure; if a given share of productive public expenditure 
is assumed, the utility and production functions call for different formulations, thereby making the Ricardian proposition fail. 
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3 Empirical attempts to test Ricardian equivalence in the literature 
3.1 The implications for the national saving ratio and the correlation between fiscal 
and current account balances 
As explained above, the Ricardian equivalence proposition would imply stability of total 
national saving in a way that changes in general government’s saving should be offset by 
private saving. Accordingly, a strict version of the Ricardian proposition would suggest that 
the national saving ratio (gtot) should be stationary.8 In other words, although not being 
constant, it should resume to its “normal” value after some time following a shock, even when 
neither the public (sg) nor the private (sps) saving ratio were stationary. Thus, for such a result 
to hold it is necessary that the trends of both types of saving offset each other, thereby 
leading to perfect substitution between them. This theoretical implication has led some 
authors to test the stationarity of national saving as an indirect way of addressing the 
neutrality issue. 
 In a similar fashion, Ricardian equivalence has important implications for the 
relationship between fiscal and current account balances. Specifically, under the equivalence 
theorem, for a given path of government expenditures, the timing of taxes should not 
affect the consumption decision made by tax payers. Therefore, the financing of government 
spending via debt or taxes should not affect the current account either. Moreover, under 
Ricardian regimes, higher government spending would lead to lower private consumption 
by the same amount, thereby improving the current account balance. Conversely, under 
Keynesian regimes a positive relationship between fiscal and current account balances is 
expected, i.e. the twin-deficits hypothesis. Within this framework, a shift from tax to debt 
financing increases private consumption and worsens the current account balance. Basically, 
this test would consist of estimating 
tttt ureergbca  210   (4) 
where cat is the current account balance, gbt the general government balance and reert is the 
real effective exchange rate vis à vis the OECD countries, calculated with CPI indexes9. 
Hence, under the Ricardian hypothesis β1 ≤ 0 should hold, whereas β1 > 0 would be 
consistent with the Keynesian (twin-hypothesis) framework. 
 However, it should be borne in mind that stationarity of national saving or 
non-significant or even negative correlation between current account and fiscal balances 
are only necessary but not sufficient conditions for Ricardian equivalence to hold. 
For instance, national saving could be stationary for reasons other than Ricardian behaviour of 
consumers. Accordingly, the most prominent attempts to tackle this question rely on direct 
tests over different consumption equations. Roughly speaking, two families of consumption 
equations have been employed for this purpose, notably structural consumption equations 
nesting alternative behavioural hypothesis and consumption equations derived from Euler 
maximization conditions. 
 
                                                                          
8. Since this hypothesis is not formulated in terms of ratios with respect to GDP, an implicit additional constraint 
is imposed. 
9. Afonso and Rault (2008) estimate a similar equation for different panels of EU and OECD countries. 
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3.2 Ricardian equivalence testing in structural consumption equations 
The starting point to test the empirical validity of the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis could 
be the estimation of a consumption function with disposable income and public debt as 
regressors. Within this framework, a positive and significant coefficient of public debt would 
be interpreted as evidence against Ricardian behaviour in that public debt would represent 
net wealth for households and would therefore affect consumption decisions. A similar 
approach would consist of using the general government balance instead of public debt as 
explanatory variable. This is the approach adopted in Kochin (1974), which aims at estimating 
the effects of public deficits on private consumption in the United States. For this purpose, 
Kochin estimates the following consumption function 
ttt
d
tt ugbcyc   31210   (5) 
where ct is private consumption of non-durables and services, ytd households’ disposable 
income, gbt the government balance and ut a residual. His results are obtained on the basis of 
annual data covering the period 1952-1971 and estimation of (5) in first differences. With this 
specification, if consumers were Ricardian (in its strong version), α3 should be significant and 
equal to the coefficient of disposable income α1. If, on the other hand, α3 were significant but 
lower than α1, the strong version of the Ricardian proposition would not hold, although 
it would imply that future tax duties are partially discounted, still in line with the permanent 
income hypothesis. This is what it has been called the “weak version” of the neutrality 
hypothesis by some authors. Finally, if α3 were non-significant, it would mean that consumers 
behave in a Keynesian way. In Kochin’s estimations the coefficient of the government balance 
turns out to be significant, although lower than the coefficient of disposable income, thereby 
rejecting the strong version of the Ricardian hypothesis. 
However, equation (5) is subject to numerous shortcomings. In particular, it has been 
argued that it cannot be taken as a conclusive test for the neutrality hypothesis; rather, 
as an attempt to measure the wealth effect of public deficits/debt on consumption within a 
Keynesian framework. Moreover, it raises a number of econometric concerns. Specifically, 
Buiter and Tobin (1979) argue that Kochin’s estimates are affected by simultaneity and 
identification problems in that consumption, disposable income and government balance 
are closely linked to the economic cycle. In their analysis, they consolidate the entrepreneurial 
sector with households. Under the Barro’s neutrality assumption, the relevant income for 
consumption decisions is y-g, where y is total income and g government spending. 
Accordingly, they propose the following specification:  
ttttt ugbntryc  3210   (6) 
where yt is households’ income before taxes and transfers and ntrt transfers net of taxes. 
With this specification the neutrality hypothesis would hold in its strong version if the 
coefficients of income, transfers net of taxes and the government balance were equal 
in absolute value (α1=α3=α2), whereas the weak version of this hypothesis would be accepted 
if only α3=α2 held. Conversely, consumers would be Keynesian if the coefficient of the 
government balance was non-significant and the coefficients of income and taxes net of 
transfers were equal in absolute value.  
Another possibility is to disaggregate net transfers into transfers strictly speaking and 
government receipts, mainly tax-revenue. Therefore, such specification would include 
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households’ income before taxes and transfers, total government revenues, transfers and the 
general government balance as the main regressors10:  
tttttt ugbtrtyc  43210   (7) 
Similarly to (6), specification (7) nests the Ricardian and the Keynesian hypotheses. Thus, 
a “weak” version of the neutrality hypothesis would hold if the effects of the government 
balance and transfers on consumption were just the opposite to that of taxes. Accordingly, 
the restriction would be α3= α4=- α2, implying 
 tttt ugyc  410    
where gt is government expenditure on goods and services. Likewise, the “strong” version 
of the neutrality hypothesis would verify if, additionally to the latter, the restriction that the 
coefficients of income, transfers and government balance were the same held. In this case, 
tttt u)gy(c  10   
Conversely, if consumers behaved according to the Keynesian view, the joint hypothesis 
of α1= α3=- α2 and α4=0 should hold, leading to the following consumption equation 
ttttt u)trty(c  10   
with the term in parentheses being households’ disposable income. 
In turn, Kormendi (1983) proposes a more general specification aiming 
at distinguishing between the “standard” (Keynesian) approach as opposed to the 
“consolidated” (Ricardian) one. He estimates the following consumption function:  
tttt
tttttttt
updintgre       
ttrwgyyc




1987
6543210


 (8) 
where here yt is national income, wt net wealth, ret corporate retained earnings, gintt interests 
paid on government debt and pdt-1 end-of-period t-1 public debt. Therefore, under the 
“standard” approach the private sector is assumed to ignore government spending, implying 
α3=0, whereas negative coefficients for retained profits and taxes, jointly with positive 
coefficients for interest payments and public debt are expected. By contrast, under the 
consolidated approach government consumption is expected to affect private consumption 
negatively, whereas the decision of financing spending via taxes or debt issuance is 
immaterial for consumption decisions. Moreover, if neutrality holds, neither retained profits, 
interest payments nor public debt are considered to affect consumption decisions and 
accordingly α7 = α8 = α9 = 0 should verify. 
 
 
                                                                          
10. This is the specification adopted by Raymond and González-Páramo (1987) or Fuster (1993) in the case of Spain. 
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3.3 Ricardian equivalence testing in consumption equations derived from Euler 
conditions 
This family of consumption equations is derived directly from the Euler first order conditions 
of the consumer’s intertemporal optimization problem. The main advantage of this approach 
is that the use of first order conditions avoids misspecification of consumption functions 
based on the Permanent Income hypothesis [see Seater (1993)]. Accordingly, it allows testing 
directly to what extent the necessary conditions for Ricardian equivalence hold, namely the 
absence of liquidity constraints or infinite horizons for consumers’ decisions, similar to those 
of the government, among others. 
The main empirical studies testing the neutrality hypothesis are largely based on 
the uncertainty model proposed in Blanchard (1985), where a constant fraction μ of the 
population dies every period. Blanchard’s model implies the following consumption function: 



  



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11
j
jtt
j
tt yEr
a)r(c   (9) 
where at-1 is the stock of assets at the end of period t-1, including public debt holdings, r is 
the real rate of return of assets, yt labour income net of taxes, Et the expectation operator 
conditional to the information set at period t and α the propensity to consume out of wealth. 
The aggregate budget constraint can be written as 
tttt cya)r(a  11  (10) 
Within this framework, Ricardian equivalence does not hold if μ > 0 which implies 
that consumers have finite horizons in that a wedge between consumers’ discount rates of 
future interest payments and future tax payments shows up. Thus, the effect of a finite 
constant probability of death increases consumers’ time preference, raising its effective 
subjective discount rate. In this case, the Ricardian proposition fails because consumers 
implicitly perceive that they will pay only part of future taxes and, accordingly, current public 
debt holdings are seen as net wealth. From (9) and (10) and defining a stochastic process for 
labour income an aggregate consumption function can be written without explicitly 
incorporating human wealth as follows: 
111 
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 tttt arc 
     
where ρ is such that -1< ρ < 1, β is another parameter and εt is a serially uncorrelated error 
term with a zero mean and a finite variance [Evans (1993)]. On the other hand, the aggregate 
consumption function can also be expressed in terms of non-human wealth only, as shown 
by Leiderman and Razin (1988). In this case, the consumption function would look as: 
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Interestingly, Blanchard’s specification can easily be modified in order to allow for 
the presence of liquidity constrained households. Accordingly, (9) can be rewritten as 
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where λ is the proportion of liquidity-constrained consumers. Hence, in this framework, 
consumers would be Ricardian if μ = 0 and λ = 0. On the contrary, the opposite is true. 
Amongst the alternative specifications that can be derived from Blanchard’s model 
we shall consider those in Haque (1988), Hayashi (1982) and Evans (1988), modified after the 
contribution in Himarios (1995). These are 
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Another alternative specification is due to Aschauer (1985). He models the 
intertemporal optimization problem of a representative agent’s effective consumption. Thus, 
effective consumption can be defined as 
tot
ttt gcce  , 
where θ represents the degree of substitution between private and public consumption11, cet 
effective consumption and gtott total public expenditure. The consumer faces a usual 
intertemporal optimization problem, but taking into account the government’s budget 
constraint. Therefore, the following two-equation system, comprised of one consumption 
equation strictly speaking and one equation used to forecast public consumption, is obtained: 
                                                                          
11. The literature is not conclusive in this regard. For instance, Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004) find that, for 12 European 
countries including Spain, public goods, such as defence, public order, and justice, tend to behave as substitutes 
for private consumption. By contrast, merit goods including health, education, and other services that could have been 
provided privately, complement private consumption. However, they find that the relationship between merit goods 
and private goods turns out to be stronger than that between public goods and private goods. Thus, in the aggregate 
government and private consumption tend to behave as complements. 
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ttttt
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

11
111  (15) 
where dpt is public deficit. The theoretical structure of the system imposes the following set 
of restrictions characterising the Ricardian behaviour: 
n,...,j
n,...,i
i)(
jj
i
i
i
32
32
1












 (16) 
Nevertheless, the main shortcoming of this approach is that the alternative to the neutrality 
hypothesis is not well defined. More generally, despite it has been argued that the main 
advantage of the Euler-condition based approach is that it avoids misspecification problems, 
it requires some parameter restrictions and testing of the model basic assumptions. 
Therefore, as pointed out by Himarios (1995), misspecification is still possible. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 19 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0923 
4 Econometric results 
4.1 The data 
We use quarterly data covering the period 1980:1-2007:4. Private consumption, gross total 
income and gross disposable income, as well as the private consumption deflator were taken 
from the quarterly national accounts. In turn, the quarterly fiscal variables were taken from 
Estrada et al. (2004), which were estimated applying monthly and quarterly official fiscal 
indicators on a cash basis to the official ESA-95 annual accounts data (see Appendix A 
for details). Households’ net wealth has been obtained as the sum of total financial 
wealth, including shares, other securities and government bonds, and the overall stock 
of immovable property. An estimation of private wealth was needed for some specifications. 
In this case, private wealth has been obtained by subtracting the stock of public debt from 
total wealth. All variables have been expressed in real terms by using the private consumption 
deflator. Finally, the real effective exchange rate vis à vis the OECD countries, calculated with 
CPI indexes, has been taken from the OECD Main Economic Indicators database. 
4.2 Is national saving stable? 
As mentioned above, Ricardian equivalence entails that total national saving as a percentage 
of GDP should be constant in that, under this hypothesis, public and private saving would 
become perfect substitutes. Figure 1 shows that total gross saving as a percentage of GDP 
has remained broadly stable over the period 1980-2007. By contrast, after a period of relative 
stability, private and public saving have displayed opposite trends following EMU accession. 
ADF unit root tests in Table 1 support the hypothesis of stationarity at the 10% significance 
level of total gross saving around a constant, whereas public and overall private saving seem 
to be  I(1).12 In principle, this result would be consistent with the hypothesis of substitution 
between private and public saving and, therefore, with the Ricardian proposition. 
 
Figure 1: Private and public saving 
                                                                          
12. The null hypothesis of two unit roots is rejected in all cases. 
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Table 1: ADF tests on gross saving 
 
 I(1) vs. I(0) 
 t              *t             **t  
sgt  (general government.)   -1.80 -2.45   -3.46* 
spst  (private sector) -0.51        -2.54 -3.30 
shoust  (households) -0.77   -3.85**   -5.10** 
stott     (total)  0.01        -3.19* -3.10 
 I(2) vs I(1) 
sgt  (general government.) -14.14**   
spst  (private sector) -13.49**   
shoust  (households) -15.43**   
stott     (total) -13.14**   
Note: The symbols *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of existence of one unit 
root at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
Stationarity of national saving suggests that private and public saving should be 
cointegrated, with cointegration vector (1, -1). Table 2 presents the Johansen cointegration 
test between both series. However, in this case neither the trace nor the LR maximum 
eigenvalue statistics are able to reject the null of no cointegration.13 In principle, these results 
would be in contradiction with the Ricardian hypothesis. However, although no stationary 
linear combination between both series is obtained, in view of the stationarity at the 10% 
significance level of total saving14, some degree of substitution between both appears to exist, 
as Figure 1 unveils. 
 
Table 2: Johansen cointegration test between private and public saving 
 
Nº coint. Eq. LR max 5% crit. value Trace 5% crit. value 
r=0 8.379 14.1 9.638 15.41 
r=1 1.26 3.76 1.26 3.76 
Cointegration Vector spst sgt Constant 
 1 -0.80 20.956 
ECM Const. 
Coint. 
eqt-1 
Δspst-1 Δspst-2 Δsgt-1 Δsgt-2 Δsgt-3 Δsgt-4 
Δspst 5.05**    
(0.17) 
-0.23**    
(0.08) 
- 0.23 
(0.15) 
0.42** 
(0.10)  
0.45** 
(0.16)  
0.31** 
(0.10)  
0.09 
(0.06)  
Δsgt -2.63*    
(0.17) 
0.13     
(0.08) 
-0.21** 
(0.10) 
-0.21 
(0.15) 
-0.68** 
(0.13)  
-0.57* 
(0.16)  
-0.27** 
(0.10)  
-  
H0: Cointegration vector = (1,-1) χ12= 0.78 P Value= 0.38 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 
5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
                                                                          
13. In view of the important structural undergone by the Spanish economy over the period under analysis, we took into 
account the possibility of structural breaks in the series (see Zivot and Andrews, 1992) and tested the hypothesis 
of cointegration equation with endogenously determined structural breaks between private and public saving 
[see Gregory and Hansen (1996)]. Nevertheless, the relevant statistics for structural breaks turned out to be 
non-significant. 
14. By definition, stationarity of national saving would also imply a contegration vector (1,-1) between total gross 
fixed capital formation and the net lending/net borrowing of the economy provided that both are not stationary. 
In fact, the ADF unit root tests in Appendix B show that these series are I(1), whereas the Johansen cointegration test 
confirms the existence of a cointegration vector (1,-1) between both variables (see Table B.3). 
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Table 3 presents the estimation results of (4) and shows evidence in favour of 
cointegration at the 5% significance level between current account and fiscal balances 
according to the LR maximum eigenvalue statistic. As the long-term cointegration vector 
from (4) is expressed as (1, -β0, -β1, -β2), the coefficient of the fiscal balance is negative, which 
would be consistent with the Ricardian hypothesis. This result is in line with that obtained 
by Afonso and Rault (2008) for Spain. Summing up, this subsection offers some contradictory 
results; while the stability of the national saving ratio and the long-term negative correlation 
between current account and fiscal balances would support the neutrality hypothesis, the lack 
of cointegration between private and public saving would point to the opposite conclusion. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the implications tested in this subsection are only 
necessary but not sufficient conditions for Ricardian equivalence. 
 
Table 3: Johansen cointegration test between current account and fiscal balances 
 
Nº coint. Eq. LR max 5% crit. value Trace 5% crit. Value 
r=0 22.19 21.13 27.76 29.80 
r=1 4.00 14.26 5.57 15.49 
r=2 1.57 3.84 1.57 3.84 
Cointegration Vector cat gbt reert Constant 
 1 2.37 441.32 -29687.40 
Note: according to the Akaike information criterion, the VECM has been estimated with 1 lag. 
 
4.3 Results from structural consumption equations 
In view of the various empirical methodologies, we followed an eclectic approach and tested 
the Ricardian hypothesis in the different specifications explained in section 3. However, given 
that the data are I(1), ECMs were estimated when possible to test for the existence of 
cointegration among the relevant variables. Such ECMs models were estimated in one step 
by maximum likelihood using a Marquardt algorithm15. In our specifications total (cpr) and 
non-durable (cprnodur) private consumption were included as dependent variables in turn. 
In both cases, estimations were obtained with and without including lagged private wealth 
(wh-1) as a regressor. The inclusion of households’ wealth is justified by the importance of 
this variable in determining consumption behaviour in theoretical models. Therefore, wealth is 
often found to be significant in consumption equations16. 
Table 4 shows the results corresponding to the estimation of equation (5). The 
significance of the coefficient affecting the cointegration equation constitutes evidence in 
favour of the rejection of the null of no cointegration. All the coefficients display the expected 
signs when significant and, in most cases, the coefficient of the general government balance 
is significant. However, equality between the coefficients of disposable income and the 
government balance is rejected. In principle, this would constitute evidence in favour of 
the weak version of the neutrality hypothesis, indicating that future tax duties are discounted 
only partially. Accordingly, these results would reject the strict version of the Ricardian 
hypothesis, although they would still be consistent with some degree of substitution between 
public and private saving. Nevertheless, as explained above, this test should be taken more 
                                                                          
15. The ECMs were also estimated in two steps by OLS. Since these estimations led to similar results to those 
presented here, we decided not to present them for the sake of brevity. 
16. See Sastre and Fernández (2005) for consumption functions in Spain. 
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as an attempt to measure the wealth effect of public deficits/debt on consumption within a 
Keynesian framework than a real test of the neutrality proposition. 
 
Table 4: Kochin test 
 
 cpr cpr cprnodur cprnodur 
Cointegration equation     
yd 0.92*** 
(0.03) 
1.04*** 
(0.15) 
0.76*** 
(0.01) 
0.76*** 
(0.03) 
gb 0.30** 
(0.14) 
0.21 
(0.28) 
0.22*** 
(0.05) 
0.17** 
(0.07) 
wh-1  -0.003 
(0.003) 
 -0.000 
(0.001) 
Short-term dynamics     
ECM-1 -0.13** 
(0.05) 
-0.08 
(0.06) 
-0.28*** 
(0.06) 
-0.26*** 
(0.07) 
Δcpr-1 / Δcprnodur-1 0.36*** 
(0.08) 
0.25*** 
(0.08) 
0.16* 
(0.08) 
0.12 
(0.09) 
Δyd 0.21*** 
(0.06) 
0.16*** 
(0.05) 
0.24*** 
(0.05) 
0.22*** 
(0.05) 
Δgb 0.13*** 
(0.04) 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.11*** 
(0.04) 
Δwh-1  0.004***
(0.001) 
 0.002** 
(0.001) 
Constant -114.87 
(295.64) 
-418.96 
(390.29) 
1038.94***
(357.74) 
985.89* 
(528.31) 
R2 0.44 0.52 0.45 0.48 
Nº obs. 110 110 110 110 
Wald tests     
yd = gb 16.91*** 6.92*** 94.23*** 87.62*** 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** denote rejection of the 
null hypothesis at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
As for the test proposed by Buiter and Tobin, we estimated (6), both for total and 
non-durable private consumption as dependent variables. As before, households’ private 
wealth was included as an additional regressor and we took into account the possibility 
that the series were cointegrated. In fact, the Johansen cointegration tests rejects in all 
cases the null of no cointegration, with the Trace and Maximum eigenvalue statistics 
indicating the existence of (at least) one cointegration equation (see Table 5). However, in no 
case both statistics were simultaneously significant at the 5% significance level, which led 
us to consider only one cointegration equation in the VECM models. 
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Table 5: Buiter-Tobin test: Johansen cointegration test 
 
 cpr cpr cprnodur cprnodur 
Cointegration equation     
y 0.68*** 
(0.03) 
0.86*** 
(0.06) 
0.70*** 
(0.03) 
0.66 
(0.15) 
gb -0.21 
(0.15) 
-0.80* 
(0.31) 
0.79*** 
(0.17) 
-1.76 
(0.90) 
ntr -0.18 
(0.10) 
-0.46 
(0.27) 
0.21* 
(0.10) 
-0.18 
(0.84) 
wh-1 
 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
Constant 6586.96 3590.00 8020.65 3924.04 
Trace statistics     
r=0 58.89*** 91.67*** 47.86*** 96.20*** 
r≤1 29.40* 52.12** 29.80 52.95** 
r≤2 4.30 28.12* 15.49 25.63 
r≤3 0.13 7.46 3.84 11.01 
r≤4  2.80  2.63 
LRmax. Statistics     
r=0 29.50** 39.55*** 27.58*** 43.25*** 
r≤1 25.10** 24.00 21.13 27.31* 
r≤2 4.17 20.67* 14.26 14.62 
r≤3 0.13 4.66 3.84 8.38 
r≤4  2.80*  2.63 
Nº obs. 110 106 107 109 
LR tests     
y = ntr; gb=0  (Keynesian) 18.75*** 6.93** 18.04*** 2.62 
y = gb=ntr (Ricardian) 22.56*** 12.20*** 34.31*** 12.61*** 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
 
In VECM estimates (Table 5), income coefficients are always positive and significant, 
ranging from 0.66 to 0.86. The coefficients of the general government balance and net 
transfers are also positive, as expected, and significant in the non-durable consumption 
equation without wealth. Conversely, in the total private consumption equation the 
coefficients of the general government balance and wealth are, unexpectedly, negative and 
significant, although in the former case at the 10% significance level only. In the remaining 
cases, the coefficients of the fiscal variables are not significant. In order to check the 
consistency of these estimates single ECMs were estimated in one step. Table 6 shows 
these results. As in the VECMs, the income coefficients are always positive and significant, 
and similar to those in the VECM estimates. By contrast, the long-term coefficients of the 
fiscal variables are not significant in any specification. The short-term coefficients display 
the expected sign. 
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Table 6: Buiter-Tobin test: One-step ECM estimation 
 
 cpr cpr cprnodur cprnodur 
Cointegration equation     
y 0.87*** 
(0.10) 
0.94*** 
(0.16) 
0.64*** 
(0.03) 
0.64*** 
(0.03) 
gb 0.58 
(0.44) 
0.70 
(0.64) 
0.10 
(0.14) 
-0.0004 
(0.15) 
ntr 0.30 
(0.29) 
0.63 
(0.69) 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
-0.11 
(0.14) 
wh-1 
 
-0.0002 
(0.002) 
 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Short-term dynamics     
ECM-1 -0.12** 
(0.06) 
-0.10 
(0.06) 
-0.28*** 
(0.07) 
-0.29*** 
(0.07) 
Δcpr-1 / Δcprnodur-1 0.33*** 
(0.09) 
0.23*** 
(0.09) 
0.20** 
(0.08) 
0.14* 
(0.08) 
Δy 0.24*** 
(0.05) 
0.20*** 
(0.05) 
0.26*** 
(0.05) 
0.23*** 
(0.05) 
Δgb 0.10* 
(0.06) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.10* 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
Δntr 0.02 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.003 
(0.05) 
Δwh-1 
 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
Constant 288.38 
(418.60) 
251.99 
(456.68) 
2082.45*** 
(641.90) 
1843.128*** 
(656.83) 
R2 0.47 0.56 0.46 0.50 
Nº obs. 110 110 110 110 
Wald tests     
y = ntr; gb=0  (Keynesian) 200.66*** 20.15*** 1086.83*** 126.18*** 
y = gb = ntr  (Ricardian) 29.65*** 0.33 235.19*** 37.52*** 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 
5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
We tested the neutrality hypothesis in the VECM (by means of Likelihood ratio tests) 
and in the single ECM17 (Wald tests) specifications, with both sets of estimations yielding 
largely the same results18. Ricardian equivalence is clearly rejected for non-durable 
consumption. It is also rejected for total private consumption except when wealth is included 
as regressor in the single ECM specification. However, the Ricardian hypothesis should 
not be accepted on the basis of such estimation in that the non-significant adjustment 
coefficient in the ECM reveals some misspecification. As Table 6 shows, weak neutrality does 
not seem to hold either, in that the coefficients of the government balance and net transfers 
displays sometimes unexpected negative signs but mostly because they are not significant. 
                                                                          
17. See Table 6. In this case, the significance of the coefficients of long-term residuals also rejected the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration except in one case. 
18. The single ECM specification was also estimated in two steps, leading to similar results to those in Table 6. 
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On the other hand, the “Keynesian hypothesis” is also rejected in almost all cases despite the 
coefficient of the government balance is broadly non-significant, especially in the one-step 
ECM estimations (Table 6). Thus, rejection of the Keynesian hypothesis seems to be mainly 
due to the coefficient of taxes net of transfers being also non-significant and very different 
from the income one. 
 
Table 7: Buiter-Tobin test (expanded). One step estimation 
 
 cpr cpr cprnodur cprnodur 
Cointegration equation     
y 1.10*** 
(0.22) 
1.11*** 
(0.18) 
0.76*** 
(0.05) 
0.74*** 
(0.05) 
t -0.22 
(0.23) 
-0.58 
(0.55) 
0.05 
(0.07) 
0.10 
(0.12) 
tr -1.14 
(0.83) 
-0.56 
(0.60) 
-0.73*** 
(0.26) 
-0.67*** 
(0.26) 
gb -0.003 
(0.40) 
0.25 
(0.44) 
-0.18 
(0.15) 
-0.21 
(0.15) 
wh-1  0.001 
(0.002) 
 -0.001 
(0.001) 
Short-term dynamics     
ECM-1 -0.14** 
(0.06) 
-0.12** 
(0.06) 
-0.32*** 
(0.07) 
-0.32*** 
(0.07) 
Δcpr-1 / Δcprnodur-1 0.31*** 
(0.10) 
0.22** 
(0.09) 
0.17** 
(0.08) 
0.13 
(0.08) 
Δy 0.26*** 
(0.06) 
0.22*** 
(0.05) 
0.27*** 
(0.05) 
0.25*** 
(0.05) 
Δt -0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.002 
(0.05) 
Δtr -0.05 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.08) 
-0.09 
(0.09) 
-0.08 
(0.09) 
Δgb 0.07 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
Δwh-1  0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 0.002** 
(0.001) 
Constant -338.66 
(500.86) 
 1563.40** 
(627.09) 
1476.00** 
(654.28) 
R2 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.53 
Nº obs. 110 110 110 110 
Wald tests     
gb=tr=-t  (weak neutrality) 5.14* 4.05 12.19*** 9.39*** 
y=gb=tr=-t   (Ricardian) 46.57*** 7.26* 341.57*** 53.34*** 
y =tr=-t ; gb=0  (Keynesian) 271.11*** 37.58*** 1571.33*** 162.37*** 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 
5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 8: Kormendi test 
 
 Levels First differences 
 cpr cprnodur cpr cprnodur 
ytot 
0.47*** 
(0.04) 
0.39*** 
(0.03) 
0.20*** 
(0.05) 
0.18*** 
(0.05) 
ytot-1 
0.18*** 
(0.04) 
0.18*** 
(0.03) 
0.08** 
(0.03) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
g 
 
-0.11 
(0.11) 
0.07 
(0.07) 
-0.09 
(0.06) 
-0.08 
(0.06) 
w-1 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
tr 
-0.11 
(0.12) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.04 
(0.06) 
t 
0.17*** 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.10** 
(0.04) 
0.08* 
(0.04) 
re 
-0.36*** 
(0.08) 
-0.39*** 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.09) 
-0.05 
(0.09) 
gint 
-0.25 
(0.15) 
-0.46*** 
(0.10) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
0.02 
(0.19) 
pd-1 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Constant 
6719.51***
(1992.76) 
8518.37***
(1184.85) 
233.11***
(71.21) 
245.42*** 
(67.61) 
R2 0.999 0.999 0.55 0.47 
Nº obs. 111 111 110 110 
Wald tests     
y = tr=-t=-re=gint; g=0 (Keynesian) 156.31*** 226.56*** 31.87*** 27.31*** 
t=re=gint=pd=0 (Ricardian) 94.00*** 198.94*** 14.92*** 9,03*  
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 
5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
The estimation of equation (7), with taxes and transfers separately, led to 
similar results. Table 7 presents these estimations for both total and non-durable private 
consumption expenditure. As in previous cases, given the non-stationarity of the series 
we allow for the possibility of cointegration and estimate one-step ECMs accordingly. 
In fact, the coefficients of long-term residuals are always significant, rejecting the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration. Except transfers in the non-durable consumption 
specifications (and in these cases with unexpected signs), the fiscal variables are not 
significant, pointing to rejection of the neutrality proposition. Indeed, such proposition, in its 
weak and strong versions, is formally rejected by the Wald tests in almost all cases. 
Specifically, neutrality in its weak form cannot be rejected for total private consumption when 
wealth is included as a regressor. Similarly to previous tests, the Keynesian model is also 
rejected due to the sizeable difference between the coefficients of taxes and total households’ 
income. 
Following Kormendi (1983), Table 8 presents our estimations in levels and in first 
differences of equation (8). Again, the coefficients of total income are positive and significant 
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regardless the specification. For the rest of the coefficients, the results are more mixed. 
As for the specification in levels, the coefficients of fiscal variables are largely non-significant 
except the coefficient of taxes in one case, which displays an unexpected positive sign. 
Moreover, the coefficients of retained earnings are negative, whereas those of public debt 
are positive. In both cases coefficients are significant. The specification in first differences 
offers some striking results, though. Namely, apart from the coefficients of income and 
wealth, the only significant ones are those of taxes and public debt, and in both cases with 
unexpected signs. 
 
Table 9: Kormendi test with interaction with changes 
in the debt-to-GDP ratio (levels) 
 
 cpr cprnodur 
ytot 
0.45*** 
(0.05) 
0.45*** 
(0.05) 
0.45*** 
(0.05) 
0.39*** 
(0.03) 
0.39*** 
(0.03) 
0.39*** 
(0.03) 
ytot-1 
0.19*** 
(0.05) 
0.18*** 
(0.05) 
0.20*** 
(0.05) 
0.18*** 
(0.03) 
0.18*** 
(0.03) 
0.18*** 
(0.03) 
g 
 
-0.07 
(0.13) 
-0.08 
(0.13) 
-0.12 
(0.12) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
w-1 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
tr 
-0.09 
(0.12) 
-0.06 
(0.13) 
-0.09 
(0.12) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
t 
0.14** 
(0.06) 
0.15** 
(0.06) 
0.16*** 
(0.06) 
-0.000 
(0.05) 
0.000 
(0.05) 
0.000 
(0.05) 
re 
-0.37*** 
(0.08) 
-0.37*** 
(0.08) 
-0.36*** 
(0.08) 
-0.40*** 
(0.05) 
-0.40*** 
(0.05) 
-0.40*** 
(0.05) 
gint 
-0.28* 
(0.16) 
-0.30* 
(0.17) 
-0.23 
(0.16) 
-0.46*** 
(0.11) 
-0.46*** 
(0.12) 
-0.45*** 
(0.11) 
pd-1 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
0.009* 
(0.004) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.004* 
(0.003) 
dpd-gdp 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
  
-0.000 
(0.000) 
 
 
dpd-gdp1  
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
 
 -0.000 
(0.000) 
 
dpd-gdp2   
-0.001* 
(0.001) 
 
 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Constant 
7383.04*** 
(2165.14) 
7142.87*** 
(2177.88) 
6988.07***
(2079.43) 
8374.10*** 
(1332.83) 
8357.41*** 
(1302.44) 
8376.73*** 
(1250.93) 
R2 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
Nº obs. 107 107 107 107 107 107 
Wald tests       
y=tr=-t=-
se=gint; 
g=0 (Keynesian) 
160.32*** 161.52*** 132.51*** 212.93*** 221.08*** 205.04*** 
t=re=gint=pd=0 
(Ricardian) 
116.49*** 114.16*** 100.63*** 198.14*** 204.95*** 188.52*** 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5% and 
1% significance levels, respectively. 
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In any case, both sets of specifications led again to rejection of the Ricardian 
proposition mainly due to the significance of the public debt and tax coefficients and the 
non-significance of public expenditure. Furthermore, despite the latter, the Wald tests led to 
the rejection of the “standard” (Keynesian) approach too. This is due to the sizeable difference 
between the coefficients of fiscal variables and income. In this case, ECM one-step 
coefficients are not presented because the large number of coefficients led to multicolinearity 
problems and near-singular variance-covariance matrix that hampered the estimation. 
The effects of public debt on consumption may be non-linear in the sense that higher 
government indebtedness would lead consumers to anticipate future higher taxes. If so, one 
could conclude that consumers would become increasingly Ricardian as public debt went up. 
In order to test this hypothesis, equation (8) is augmented to account for interaction effects 
between the level of public debt and changes in the debt-to-GDP ratio, as follows: 
                 
tttttt
tttttttt
updratio*pdpdintgre       
ttrwgyyc




11101987
6543210


                                        (8’) 
where pd*Δpdratio is the aforementioned interaction term. Equation (8’) was estimated in 
levels and three possibilities for the interaction term were considered: first, the interaction 
between the level of public debt and changes in the debt-to-GDP ratio as such; second, the 
same as in the previous case but only when the debt-to-GDP ratio increased; and third, 
the interaction of the level of public debt with a dummy that takes value 1 if the debt-to-GDP 
ratio increases and 0 otherwise, in line with Afonso (2008). The results in Table 9 are very 
similar to those in Table 8: the coefficients of fiscal variables are largely non-significant except 
the coefficient of taxes in total private consumption specifications, although with an 
unexpected positive sign; the coefficients of retained earnings and interest payments 
are usually negative and significant; the coefficients of public debt are always positive and 
significant at the 10% significance level and, finally, as expected, the interaction coefficients 
are negative, although only significant in total private consumption specifications. As in the 
previous case, both the Ricardian and the “standard” (Keynesian) approaches are rejected. 
The process of gradual openness Spain has been immersed in stepped up in the last 
decade. This factor might have affected consumption patterns by providing wider financing 
opportunities. We took into account this element and included the volume of net foreign 
assets as an additional regressor in the previous specifications. However, this variable was 
not significant and its inclusion did not alter the results in Tables 4 to 9. 
In sum, all the tests based on structural consumption equations presented in this 
sub-section reject the Ricardian equivalence proposition. However, the estimated models 
reject the Keynesian hypothesis too. As a result, rejection of both extreme cases could be 
consistent with the view that consumers, although discounting future tax behaviour, 
they only do it in part. This might be mainly explained by consumers horizons being 
shorter than governments’ ones. As a matter of fact, consumers having finite horizons is 
the main reason claimed by Cardia to reject Ricardian equivalence19. The estimates in Table 9 
might be consistent with this hypothesis. They also seem to provide some support, although 
weak, to the hypothesis of non-linear effects of public debt on consumption in the sense 
of consumers becoming increasingly Ricardian the higher government indebtedness is. 
                                                                          
19. Cardia (1997) uses simulated series and tests Ricardian equivalence in a model that nests the Ricardian hypothesis 
in a non-Ricardian one. 
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In this regard, the higher the level of public debt, the sooner households expect to be 
confronted with higher taxes20. 
4.4 Results from Euler-type consumption equations 
As in the previous sub-section, the neutrality hypothesis was tested in three alternative 
specifications. As explained in section 3, the specifications employed allow for two main 
sources of rejection of the Ricardian proposition, notably finite consumers‘ horizons and 
liquidity constraints. Table 10 presents the unrestricted Maximum Likelihood estimation 
of consumption equations (12), (13) and (14). As in the previous subsection, the three 
specifications are estimated for both total and non-durable private consumption. In this case, 
the variables have been expressed in real per-capita terms. 
 
Table 10: Euler equations tests 
 
 Model (12) Model (13) Model (14) 
 cpr cprnodur cpr cprnodur cpr cprnodur 
ct-1 1.75*** 
(0.22) 
1.37*** 
(0.20) 
1.07*** 
(0.05) 
0.97*** 
(0.04) 
1.02*** 
(0.05) 
1.02*** 
(0.01) 
ct-2 -0.72*** 
(0.22) 
-0.38*** 
(0.20) 
    
yt 0.19 
(0.12) 
0.26** 
(0.10) 
0.20 
(0.13) 
0.25 
(0.10) 
0.24 
(0.12) 
0.22** 
(0.10) 
yt-1 0.06 
(0.14) 
0.07 
(0.12) 
-0.26* 
(0.12) 
-0.19 
(0.10) 
-0.24 
(-) 
-0.22 
(-) 
yt-2 -0.27** 
(0.12) 
-0.31** 
(0.10) 
    
at-1     -0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
at-2   -0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
  
LR tests     
μ=0  ( 22 ) 6.06** 14.20*** 1.85 2.03 1.26 2.03 
λ=0   ( 22 ) 6.29** 13.04*** 2.58 6.19** 4.64* 7.04** 
μ=λ=0   ( 23 ) 6.32* 14.20*** 6.16 7.12* 5.57 7.11* 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 
5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
The Euler equation-based tests in Table 10 are less conclusive than those on 
structural consumption functions. While the neutrality hypothesis is rejected for non-durable 
consumption, the results are more mixed for total private consumption. In particular, 
                                                                          
20. In this regard, our results are consistent with the findings in Nickel and Vansteenkiste (2008) in that Ricardian 
equivalence does not seem to hold for low-debt countries. In particular, Nickel and Vansteenkiste (2008) show that 
low debt EU countries tend to show a Keynesian behaviour in that they find a positive relationship between fiscal 
balances and the current account. However, this relationship weakens as public debt increases, turning non-significant 
in very high debt countries. This result is interpreted as consumers becoming increasingly Ricardian with the level of 
public debt. 
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Ricardian equivalence is rejected with both versions of Model (12), specified on the basis 
of current and lagged values of consumption and income. In this case, the hypotheses of 
infinite horizons and lack of liquidity constraints are rejected. In turn, the hypothesis of infinite 
horizons (μ=0) cannot be rejected in Model (13), whereas absence of liquidity constraints and 
the joint hypothesis of μ = λ = 0 are rejected again, but only in the case of non-durable 
consumption. Consequently, the hypothesis of debt neutrality does not seem to hold either. 
A similar picture emerges from Model (14). In this case, however, the hypothesis of absence 
of liquidity constraints is also rejected at the 5% significance level in the total private 
consumption specification. It is worth noting that when the joint hypothesis of μ = λ = 0 is 
rejected, in most cases rejection only takes place at the 10% significance level. Moreover, 
it is important to bear in mind that the coefficients of wealth are zero or close to in Models (13) 
and (14), which in principle would be in accordance with the fulfilment of the Ricardian 
proposition. Therefore, these apparently contradictory results might suggest that, despite 
its rejection, the departure from the neutrality proposition might not be too large. Such 
implication would be in line with the results obtained in sub-sections 4.2 and 4.3. 
 
Table 11: Euler equations tests (time-varying interest rates) 
 
 Model (12) Model (13) Model (14) 
 cpr cprnodur cpr cprnodur cpr cprnodur 
ct-1 0.94*** 
(0.13) 
0.84*** 
(0.12) 
0.97*** 
(0.05) 
0.89*** 
(0.04) 
1.00*** 
(0.01) 
0.99*** 
(0.01) 
ct-2 0.06*** 
(0.14) 
0.10*** 
(0.12) 
    
yt 0.69*** 
(0.14) 
0.66*** 
(0.11) 
0.60*** 
(0.13) 
0.52*** 
(0.10) 
0.57*** 
(0.12) 
0.49** 
(0.10) 
yt-1 -0.43** 
(0.16) 
-0.30** 
(0.12) 
-0.55*** 
(0.13) 
-0.39*** 
(0.10) 
-0.58 
(-) 
-0.48 
(-) 
yt-2 -0.24** 
(0.15) 
-0.26** 
(0.12) 
    
at-1     0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
at-2   0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00** 
(0.00) 
  
LR tests     
μ=0  ( 22 ) 4.90* 11.88*** 3.03 11.98*** 3.76 13.33*** 
λ=0   ( 22 ) 24.90*** 33.98*** 21.62*** 27.73*** 21.45*** 27.86*** 
μ=λ=0   ( 23 ) 25.10*** 35.56*** 27.65*** 38.32*** 28.48*** 39.67*** 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 
5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
The estimates in Table 10 have been obtained under the assumption of 
constant interest rates. Models (12), (13) and (14) have been re-estimated considering 
time-varying interest rates. Again, these models were estimated by Maximum Likelihood. 
Table 11 shows these results. In general, the coefficients are more significant than those 
in Table 10 and with the expected signs, except for the coefficients of wealth. According to 
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these estimates, the Ricardian proposition would be rejected in all cases. In the case of total 
private consumption infinite horizons (μ=0) is accepted in two out of the three cases. Hence, 
rejection of the neutrality hypothesis would be mainly due to the rejection of absence of 
liquidity constraints. In the case of non-durable consumption, both hypotheses are rejected at 
the 1% significance level. However, the same apparent contradiction detected with constant 
interest rates emerges again: the coefficients of wealth are almost zero, which, in principle, 
would be in accordance with the Ricardian proposition. As in the previous case, this result is 
interpreted as the deviation from the neutrality hypothesis being relatively limited. 
Finally, the Aschauer’s approach [system (15)] that models consumer’s effective 
consumption, including public expenditure, is presented in Table 12. The likelihood-ratio test 
shows that the set of hypotheses (16) defining Ricardian behaviour are rejected. However, 
despite rejection of the neutrality proposition in this context, the problem of this test is that the 
alternative to Ricardian behaviour is not specified in the model. 
 
Table 12: The Aschauer test 
 
 ct-1 gt-1 gt-2 dpt-1 dpt-2  /   
Unrestricted model 
ct 1.036*** 
(0.020) 
0.050  
(0.118) 
-0.115 
(0.115) 
-0.018 
(0.035) 
-0.000 
(0.036) 
-0.018 
(0.016) 
gt  0.923*** 
(0.098) 
0.068 
(0.098) 
-0.036 
(0.029) 
0.083** 
(0.030) 
0.016** 
(0.006) 
Restricted model 
ct 1.014*** 
(0.001) 
0.037  
(-) 
-0.034 
(-) 
0.008 
(0.013) 
-0.022 
(-) 
-0.021 
(-) 
gt  0.899*** 
(0.082) 
0.104 
(0.082) 
-0.027 
(0.024) 
0.069** 
(0.028) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
LR test of restrictions: 
2
4  = 13.62 [Pval. = 0.01] 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** denote rejection of 
the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
 In sum, the results in this sub-section broadly lean toward rejection of the Ricardian 
hypothesis, especially when non-durable consumption is taken as the dependent variable. 
The tests are not entirely conclusive, though. In fact, two of the specifications based on the 
Blanchard’s model with total private consumption and constant real interest rates failed to 
reject the neutrality proposition. Nevertheless, the estimates suggest that the departure 
from such proposition might not be too large. 
4.5 Our results in context 
Our results lean toward rejection of the Ricardian proposition in Spain. As highlighted 
above, such result is far from surprising in that debt neutrality is only obtained under 
very tight theoretical conditions that do not seem to hold in real economies. Specifically, 
liquidity constraints, distortionary taxation, uncertainty about future taxes and income and 
especially the presence of finite horizons are responsible for the rejection of the Ricardian 
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equivalence hypothesis. In particular, all the tests carried out over different structural 
consumption functions reject the Ricardian proposition. In turn, although less clearly and 
depending on the functional form, the tests on consumption equations stemming from Euler 
conditions also tend to reject the hypothesis of debt neutrality. However, our results seem to 
support the existence of some degree of substitution between public and private saving, 
which could be consistent with the view that consumers, although discounting future tax 
behaviour, they only do it in part. Therefore, the departure from the Ricardian proposition 
might be limited from an empirical point of view. 
Our conclusions are in accordance with earlier studies that include Spain in their 
tests. Specifically, Fuster (1993) estimates a consumption function similar to (7) for the largest 
five EU countries, with her conclusions varying depending on the country. In the case of 
Spain, the strong version of the Ricardian proposition is rejected, although the results 
point to the private sector offsetting partially higher public deficits. Likewise, Argimón (1996) 
accomplishes a very comprehensive study for a set of EU countries and addresses 
this problem from different angles. Her results are mixed too depending on the approach 
and the country, although in the case of Spain, the Ricardian hypothesis tends to be 
rejected by the data. In turn, Marchante (1993) finds that public consumption in Spain exerts 
a non-significant effect on private consumption, whereas significant effects of taxes 
net of transfers are detected, thereby rejecting Ricardian equivalence. Raymond and 
González-Páramo (1987) also obtain evidence against both versions of the Ricardian 
hypothesis for Spain, e.g. strong and weak, with a model nesting both as well as the 
Keynesian alternative, basically equation (7). By contrast, García and Ramajo (2002), with 
Spanish data for the period 1955-2000, gets evidence in favour of partial debt neutrality, 
rejecting the strict Ricardian and Keynesian alternatives. Finally, Afonso (1998), from 
Euler-type consumption equations and using panel data over the period 1970-2006 for 
the EU-15 countries, gets evidence against the hypothesis of debt neutrality. Interestingly, 
he finds that the higher government indebtedness, the more Ricardian consumers become, 
also in line with our results. 
As for other countries, empirical studies are especially numerous in the case of 
the USA. Here, the evidence is more mixed. While Barro (1979), Kochin (1974), Seater (1982), 
Kormendi (1983), Aschauer (1985), Seater and Mariano (1985), Kormendi and Meguire (1986) 
or Leiderman and Razin (1988) obtain evidence supporting the Ricardian hypothesis 
(although sometimes in its weak version), Buiter and Tobin (1979), Blinder and 
Deaton (1985), Modigliani and Sterling (1986), Feldstein and Elmendorf (1990), Evans (1993) 
or Himarios (1995) among others get the opposite result. 
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5 Concluding remarks 
The Ricardian equivalence states that the way public spending is financed does not affect 
households’ consumption decisions in that public debt does not constitute net wealth 
for households. A natural consequence is that the decision between tax or debt financing of a 
given public expenditure path is immaterial for total national saving in that what really matters 
is the present value of the whole public expenditure path. Accordingly, this proposition implies 
that public and private saving are perfect substitutes. Theoretically, the Ricardian proposition 
only holds under very tight assumptions, notably equal length of households’ and 
governments’ horizons (typically infinite time horizons for the latter), absence of liquidity 
constraints, non-distortionary taxes and lack of information asymmetries among others. 
However, these conditions are difficult, if not impossible, to observe in real economies, which 
may lead to deviations from the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. 
In this paper, we test the validity of the Ricardian proposition for the Spanish 
economy from three different approaches: a) by testing its theoretical implications on 
the stability of national saving and the relationship between fiscal and current account 
balances, b) by carrying a number of tests on different structural consumption equations and, 
c) by testing this hypothesis in consumption functions stemming from the Euler equations of a 
Blanchard-type model. In all cases, the strong version of the Ricardian proposition is rejected 
with structural consumption equations. The tests on Euler-based consumption equations 
offer similar results, though they are less conclusive; while the neutrality hypothesis is 
rejected for non-durable consumption, the evidence for total private consumption is mixed. 
These results, in accordance with earlier studies, appear quite sensible given that the 
necessary conditions for the fulfilment of the Ricardian hypothesis do not seem to hold. 
However, our results are still consistent with some degree of substitution between public and 
private saving: total national saving is found to be stationary, whereas private and public 
saving are both I(1) with opposite trends. Despite no cointegration vector between them is 
found, this might suggest that the departure from the neutrality proposition might not be too 
large. Finally, we find some support, although admittedly weak, to the hypothesis of 
non-linear effects of public debt on consumption in the sense of consumers becoming 
increasingly Ricardian the higher government indebtedness is. In terms of policy implications, 
our results would suggest that there is some room for fiscal policy to exert its countercyclical 
role in the case of Spain. However, the effectiveness of such a policy might be limited in a 
context of rising debt ratios triggering sustainability concerns and making consumers 
increasingly Ricardian. 
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Appendix A: Construction of quarterly fiscal variables 
The quarterly fiscal variables, except public consumption, are not directly available and 
it became necessary to interpolate the official annual national accounts data. In general, the 
interpolation method was achieved by using the Denton method in second relative differences 
with relevant indicators. The indicators were usually the quarterly concept corresponding 
to the annual one, on a national accounts basis, obtained by the Statistical Department of the 
Bank of Spain from official data of budgetary execution relevant for each item. It is worth 
noting that these quarterly concepts obtained directly from budgetary execution were used as 
indicators instead of being incorporated directly because the quarterly series were not always 
fully compatible with the national accounts annual official figures. Accordingly, the method 
employed corrects the levels of official data of budgetary execution, but preserves the 
quarterly dynamics unaltered. The remaining paragraphs describe the detailed procedure 
followed for the most important items. 
In particular, the quarterly compensation of employees and the gross operating 
surplus (which by definition is consumption of fixed capital in the general government sector) 
were interpolated using as indicators the quarterly compensation of employees and the gross 
operating surplus, respectively, of non-market services (of which the general government 
sector is by far the most important one) of the quarterly national accounts. The correlation 
between the growth rates of the annual series and the annual growth rate of the indicator 
was perfect. 
Indirect taxes net of subsidies received by the general government were obtained 
by subtracting those corresponding to the rest of the world from indirect taxes net of 
subsidies of the whole economy. The latter two are provided on a quarterly basis by the INE. 
However, the quarterly data for indirect taxes net of subsidies of the rest of the world is 
available only since 1995. Beforehand, the indicators used were transfers to the European 
Union plus the VAT resource for resources and current transfers from EAGGF-guarantee for 
subsidies. These indicators captured reasonably well the evolution of the national accounts 
data in that their correlations were 0.92 and 0.97, respectively. 
As for direct taxes, the indicator used in the interpolation procedure was obtained 
from monthly data of budgetary execution on a national accounts basis since 1999. These 
data are extended with the quarter-on-quarter growth rates of a four-term non-centred 
moving average of direct taxes on a national accounts basis estimated by the Statistical 
Department of the Bank of Spain. Again, the correlation between the growth rates of the 
annual series and the annual growth rate of the indicator was 1. 
As in the case of direct taxes, social contributions and social transfers were 
interpolated by using their corresponding quarterly indicators on a national accounts basis 
obtained by the Statistical Department of the Bank of Spain, with almost perfect correlation 
between the indicators and the official annual series. 
The case of property income received was different in that interpolation was not 
necessary, given that this series coincides with the estimated one by the Statistical 
Department of the Bank of Spain. 
Finally, public investment was interpolated since 1998 using the Construction 
Industry Production Index for public works released by the INE as indicator. Before 1998 the 
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indicators used for the interpolation were central government plus social security investment 
and tenders of public works of the state and local governments. In this case, the correlation 
with the annual series was 0.88. 
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Appendix B: Relationship between net lending/net borrowing and gross fixed capital 
formation 
Tables B.1 and B.2 show the unit root tests on the gross fixed capital formation and the net 
lending/net borrowing, respectively, of the different institutional sectors. In all cases, the null of 
one unit root cannot be rejected, whereas the hypothesis of two unit roots is clearly rejected. 
 
Table B.1: ADF tests on gross fixed capital formation 
 
 I(1) vs. I(0) 
 t  *t  **t  
igt  (general government.) 0.17  -3.01* -2.87 
ipst  (private sector) 0.74 -1.54 -2.04 
ihoust  (households) 0.82 0.09 -2.49 
itott     (total) 0.83 -0.65 -1.64 
 I(2) vs I(1) 
igt  (general government.) -11.49**   
ipst  (private sector) -15.42**   
ihoust  (households) -11.04**   
itott     (total) -14.21**   
 
Note: The symbols *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of existence of one unit 
root at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
Table B.2: ADF tests on net lending/net borrowing 
 
 I(1) vs. I(0) 
 t  *t  **t  
ngt  (general government.) -1.60 -2.11 -3.49* 
npst  (private sector) -0.73 -0.60 -2.04 
nhoust  (households) -1.56 -1.81 -3.44 
ntott     (total) 0.06 -0.57 -1.59 
 I(2) vs I(1) 
ngt  (general government.) -14.17**   
npst  (private sector) -11.09**   
nhoust  (households) -14.54**   
ntott     (total) -12.34**   
 
Note: The symbols *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of existence of one unit 
root at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
Given that total net lending/net borrowing and total gross fixed capital formation 
are both I(1), stationarity of national saving should imply a cointegration vector (1,-1) 
between both. Table B.3 confirms this intuition. In principle, this result would be in 
accordance with one of the implications of Ricardian equivalence, notably stationarity of total 
gross saving. Nevertheless, such accordance does not necessarily imply the fulfilment of the 
Ricardian hypothesis, as shown in the paper. 
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Table B.3: Johansen cointegration test between gross fixed capital formation and 
net lending/net borrowing 
 
Nº coint. Eq. LR max 5% crit. value Trace 5% crit. value 
r=0 19.59*** 14.1 21.99*** 15.41 
r=1 2.39 3.76 2.59 3.76 
Cointegration Vector itott ntotgt Constant 
 1 -1.02 21.169 
ECM Const. 
Coint. 
eqt-1 
Δitott-1 Δitott-2 Δntott-1 Δntott-2 Δntott-3 Δntott-4 
Δitott 1.01***    
(0.06) 
0.05     
(-) 
-0.40*** 
(0.09) 
0.10 
(0.09) 
-0.07 
(0.06)  
-0.12 
(0.06)  
-0.15** 
(0.06)  
-0.17*** 
(0.06)  
Δntott 5.61***    
(1.36) 
-0.26***   
(0.06) 
0.08 
(0.15) 
0.03 
(0.14) 
-0.18** 
(0.09)  
-0.11 
(0.09)  
-0.01 
(0.09)  
0.06 
(0.08)  
H0: Cointegration vector = (1,-1) χ12= 0.02 P Value= 0.88 
 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 
5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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